filbar at centrum.cz
Tue Dec 8 01:35:11 PST 2009
Dne Tue, 08 Dec 2009 00:52:27 -0500
Robert Connolly <robert at linuxfromscratch.org> napsal(a):
> I want to brainstorm something I brought up before.
> The firefox (or irssi, or even ssh client) program could be run as
> another user/group (suid/sgid), so that it does not have permission
> to read/write/execute files it does not need. So it has less than
> your permissions. But, under this design firefox would be able to
> write to other user's cache. What is the way around this problem?
> chroot might be of help. The firefox client could chroot to
> ~/.firefox, running as the firefox user/group, who has permission on
> your ~/.firefox directory. Other users would not have the ability to
> do this if they're confined to this /usr/bin/ssh script.
> Making /usr/bin/ssh a script to use suid myusername-suid, is another
> idea, so that system users do not reuse the same user for firefox (or
> irssi, or ssh)... so it is impossible for one program to get
> permissions on another. The number of usernames in /etc/password
> skyrockets with this though... with one new user for each
> application, multiplied by each user.
> Access control lists can also control this, but I am looking for
> another level to create a redundancy.
Why you don't use SELinux? This system solves all in this e-mail.
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